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COMMENT

Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact

Enough?

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Not in my backyard!" This simple statement and the vigorous efforts
to enforce it have resulted over the last sixteen years in a growing
movement in minority communities in search of what has been termed
"environmental justice." It is claimed by activists, and proven in
numerous studies, that minorities are more likely to be affected by the
siting of hazardous waste facilities and the permitting of other hazardous waste producers than are whites.' The causes of these inequities
are neither uniform nor easily identifiable. Unfortunately, remedies
may be equally elusive. Lack of resources, political power, and practical
knowledge have proven all too often to be insurmountable obstacles to

1. Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?A
LongitudinalAnalysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 4 (1997). See

also Charles J. McDermott, Testimony submitted to the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights (March 3, 1993) (stating that, although
hazardous waste treated in off-site facilities does pose some risk, it should be remembered
that "the entire commercial hazardous waste industry handles only 3% of the hazardous
waste in this country," with the rest being handled by the generator on-site).
2. Been & Gupta, supra note 1, at 6.
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the resolution of conflicts over the siting of hazardous waste producers
or handlers.3
Civil rights claims based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution have proven particularly ineffective because discriminatory
intent is so difficult to establish. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
19644 and the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's) implementing regulations' have recently been utilized as a potential alternative
to equal protection claims. During the 1998 term, however, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision in Chester
Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif,6 the first decision
recognizing an implied private right of action under the EPA's regulations.7 Private citizens' groups are now faced with uncertainty on their
ability to file private environmental justice actions without evidence of
discriminatory intent.
This comment examines the environmental justice issue with an eye
toward establishing the viability of Title VI as a tool for achieving some
measure of protection for minority communities. Specifically, Part II
provides a brief overview of the environmental justice problem,
discussing both its chronological development and its substantive
elements. Part III examines the traditional methods of recourse in
environmental justice: claims brought under environmental laws and
claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Part IV introduces Title VI and the EPA's implementing
regulations as an alternative to equal protection challenges. Part V
introduces the reader to Chester, Pennsylvania, and provides initial
procedural history for ChesterResidents Concernedfor QualityLiving v.
Seif. Part VI then provides an analysis of the Third Circuit's reasoning
in Seif, identifying the rationale for an implied private right of action
within the EPA's regulations. Next, Part VII examines subsequent
litigation addressing the private right of action. This Comment then
concludes by recognizing the growing trend in courts across the country
allowing disparate impact claims under Title VI and associated
implementing regulations, and urging the utilization of these provisions
in addition to tools already in place for addressing environmental justice
concerns.

3. See Alice Kaswan, EnvironmentalJustice: Bridgingthe GapBetween Environmental
Laws and "Justice,"47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 272 (1997).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994).
5. 40 C.F.R. § 7.10 et seq. (1998).
6. 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
7. 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998).
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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OVERVIEW

Environmental justice advocates generally trace the movement's origin
back to 1982, when state officials in North Carolina approved the siting
of a poly-chlorinated biphenyl ("PCB") plant near a predominantly
African-American community in Warren County.' The protests that
accompanied the controversy were comparable to those of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s.' The controversy over the PCB plant siting
prompted Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, who participated in the
demonstrations, to request that the U.S. General Accounting Office
("GAO") conduct a study "of the socioeconomic and racial composition of
the communities surrounding the four major hazardous waste landfills
The study, entitled Siting of Hazardous Waste
in the South.""0
Landfills and their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of
SurroundingCommunities,completed in 1983, found that "[bilacks make
up the majority of the population in three of the four communities where
the landfills are located," and that "[alt least 26 percent of the population in all four communities have income below the poverty level and
most of this population is Black."" Furthermore, the study found that
three out of every five African-American and Latino residents lived in
communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites. 2
A broader study conducted by the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice ("CC")and reported in 1987, concluded that race
proved to be a more significant factor in the siting of hazardous waste
facilities than did socioeconomic status, even after the study controlled
for urbanization and regional differences. 3 In particular, the study
found that "[i]n communities with two or more operating hazardous
waste facilities or one of the five largest landfills, the mean minority
percentage of the population was more than three times that of

8. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice, 5
MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994).

9. Paul Mohai, Ph.D., Testimony presented to the House Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights (Mar. 4, 1993).
10. Id. (Congressman Fauntroy was also one of over 500 persons arrested during the
demonstrations).
11. Been & Gupta, supra note 1, at 801 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES at 2 (1983)).

12. Id. at 802.
13. Id. The UCC study investigated controlled and uncontrolled hazardous waste
treatment facilities across the country. Id. at 801.
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communities without facilities (38 percent versus 12 percent)." 14 The
study also concluded that in communities with one hazardous waste
facility in operation, the minority percentage of the population was
double that of communities without facilities.'" The GAO study and
the UCC study represent the first detailed investigations into whether
race plays a role in the selection of sites for hazardous waste facilities. 16
The data provided by these studies prompted EPA Administrator
William K Reilly, in 1990, to appoint an "Environment and Equity"
working group.' 7 The group was charged with the task of assessing
evidence that racial minority and low-income communities bear a higher
environmental risk burden than the geieral population, and considering
what, if anything, the EPA might do about it.'" The report, distinguishing between exposure to pollutants and consequent health effects,
found that exposure did vary by race and by socioeconomic factors, and
that "clear evidence [exists] that there are differences by race for disease
and death rates." 9 Among the reasons cited by the EPA report for the
disparity between races were (1) the physical proximity to hazardous
waste cites,2" (2) minority consumption of contaminated food,2 ' and (3)

14. Id. at 802. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "EnvironmentalJustice": The
DistributionalEffects of EnvironmentalProtection,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787,802 n.56 (1993)
(identifying possible methodological and statistical confidence problems).

15. Been & Gupta, supra note 1, at 802. The study also concluded that of every five
Black and Hispanic Americans, three lived in communities with "uncontrolled toxic waste
sites." Id. A follow-up study conducted in 1994 found that the average percentage of
minority residents living near hazardous waste sites had increased since the 1987 study.
See DR. BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, Toxic WASTES AND RACE REVISITED 2-5
(Center for Policy Alternatives 1994).
16. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 801. Subsequent studies have attempted to determine
whether the disproportionate distribution of waste treatment facilities among minorities

is a result of race-based siting policies and procedures, or is, rather, a result of minorities
"coming to" the hazard due to lower property values. While less than conclusive on the
causation question, several of these studies do indicate that waste facilities tend to be
placed in minority communities more often than in white communities. See Vicki Been,
Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or
Market Dynamics, 103 YALE U.L. REV. 1383, 1405 (1994) (concluding that there is
significant evidence to suggest that waste treatment facilities are disproportionately
located in minority neighborhoods). But see John E. Milner & John Turner, Environmental
Justice, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVYT. 478, 478-79 (1999) (arguing that many studies have
concluded that there is no actual disparity in the siting of hazardous waste facilities).
17. See ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND
EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENViRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES,
WORKGROUP REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR (June 1992).
18. Id. at 2.

19. Id. at 11, 13.
20. Id. at 14-15.
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minority farmworker exposure to pesticides.'
Finally, the Report
suggested that some minorities may suffer disproportionately from
environmental pollution, both because of the greater incidence of
exposure and because members of minority groups may be more
vulnerable to the effects of the pollution.'
Many commentators believe the current distributional inequity can be

attributed to the lack of political clout in minority communities.24 This

premise is supported by recorded efforts of private industry to minimize
resistance to siting of their facilities. In 1984 Cerrell Associates
conducted a study to determine the feasibility of siting a hazardous
waste treatment facility in a particular area. The study noted that "all
socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major
facilities, but middle and upper socioeconomic strata possess better
resources to effectuate their opposition. Middle and higher socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall within the one-mile and
five-mile radius of the proposed site."25 The obvious message to facility

developers is to locate waste facilities in lower socioeconomic strata

21. Id. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 22. The report stated the conclusion may be reached that some population
groups identified as sensitive to the health effects of air pollution (asthmatics, persons with
certain cardiovascular diseases or anemia, and women at risk of delivering low-birth-weight
fetuses) appear to be "disproportionately composed of low-income or racial minority
individuals compared to the general population." See also Lazarus, supra note 14, at 806
(discussing the increased sensitivity of certain population subgroups to most contaminants);
and Dominique R. Shelton, The PrevalentExposure of Low Income and Minority Communities to HazardousMaterials:The Problem and How to Fix It, 5 BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J. 1, 3
(Summer/Fall 1997) (noting that exposure to hazardous materials can cause increased risk
of cancer, birth defects, lung diseases, kidney disorders, liver problems, bone marrow
diseases, and damage to the immune and nervous systems).
24. See Sheila Foster, JusticeFrom the Ground Up: DistributiveInequities,Grassroots
Resistance,and the TransformativePoliticsof the EnvironmentalJustice Movement, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 775, 799 (1998) ("Conventional industry wisdom counsels private companies to
target sites that are in neighborhoods least likely to express opposition'-poorly educated
and lower socioeconomic neighborhoods with little if any commercial activity"). See also
Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 400 (1991)
(noting that, although civil rights groups have occasionally been successful in opposing the
siting of hazardous waste facilities in their communities, "minority communities often do
not have the political influence or resources to compete with their affluent white
counterparts, nor the level of representation in the state legislatures to compete even with
poor whites. Therefore, because hazardous waste sites must go somewhere, they are
frequently placed in poor, minority communities").
25. Robert Bullard, Dumping in Black and White, in WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES:
SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE, AND ENviRoNMENT 4, 18 (Dana Alston, ed. 1990) (citing the Cerrell
Associates report).
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communities, the population of which are disproportionately minority in
make-up.
In addition to political powerlessness, segregated housing patterns in
minority communities, low home and property values in and around
selected communities, and lack of sufficient resources and practical
knowledge of the process required to oppose hazardous waste facilities
may all contribute to a developer's choice of sites.2 6 It is even possible
that part of the responsibility for the disproportionate siting of waste
treatment facilities in minority communities may be attributed to
community leaders in search of jobs and tax support.2 7 Unfortunately,

any economic benefits accruing to the host community via hazardous
waste facilities probably will not adequately offset the serious health

risks and the economic depression associated with the potential
reluctance of new businesses to relocate in communities hosting waste
facilities.2 8
Furthermore, once a facility is located in a minority community, and
hazardous waste is released into the environment, evidence indicates
differential treatment of "white" and "minority" sites.29 Federal and
state agencies do not possess adequate funds to respond to every
violation, and enforcement agencies have much discretion in deciding on
enforcement priorities. 0
The National Law Journal, in a study
conducted in 1992, found that agencies are slower to begin the clean-up
of hazardous waste sites located near minority or low-income communities,3' and when agencies do take remedial action, the response chosen
for minority communities is often inferior to that selected for white

26. See Godsil, supra note 24, at 399-400.
27. McDermott, supra note 1, at 11-12 (McDermott pointed out in his testimony that

"liltis

often overlooked that siting is ...

a local land use issue .. ." and that revenue

generated by waste facilities often improves schools and health care delivery systems,
provides employment, and contributes to other civic projects). But see Foster, supra note
24, at 786.
28. It is important to note at this point that opposition to the siting of hazardous waste
treatment facilities in minority communities is rarely unanimous. See Environmentalists
Seek To Make Shintech Delay More Permanent, in THE CHEMICAL MARKET REPORTER,
Monday, September 22, 1997, located at 1997 WL 8497940 (quoting Ernest Johnson,
president of the Louisiana Conference of NAACP, noting that in a door-to-door community
survey by the St. James NAACP branch, seventy-three percent of African Americans
favored the placement of the chemical plant, twenty-four percent were against it, and three
percent had no opinion).
29. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection. The Racial Divide In
Environmental Law. A Special Investigation, 15 NATL L.J. s2, col.1 (Sept. 21, 1992).
30. Kaswan, supra note 3, at 238.
31. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 29, at 2 ("In more than half of the 10 autonomous
regions that administer EPA programs around the country, action on cleanup at Superfund
sites begins from 12 percent to 42 percent later at minority sites than at white sites").
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environmental laws are lower than in white communities.3 3 It appears
that minority communities do not receive equal consideration or
treatment before or after hazardous waste facilities are sited.
In 1994 President Clinton got involved in the environmental justice
issue when he published Executive Order 12,898, entitled Federal
Actions To Address EnvironmentalJustice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations. The Order instructed federal agencies to make
achieving environmental justice part of their mission by "identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of [their] programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the
United States.. . ."4 The Order also created an Interagency Working
Group on Environmental Justice, to be formed within three months by
the EPA."6 The group would provide guidance to, and coordinate
research efforts with, federal agencies.3 6 Finally, section 2-2 of the
Order requires each agency to conduct all of its programs, policies, and
activities substantially affecting health or the environment in a manner
that ensures minorities are not denied participation based on race, color,
or national origin.37
In the memorandum accompanying the Executive Order, the President
directed federal agencies to ensure compliance with the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI." In response, the EPA published the
Interim Guidance For InvestigatingTitle VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits, which was intended to prepare the agency to
handle an anticipated increase in the number of Title VI complaints

32. Id. ("At minority sites, the EPA chooses 'containment,' the capping or walling off
of a hazardous dump site, 7 percent more frequently than the cleanup method preferred
under the law, permanent 'treatment,' to eliminate the waste or rid it of its toxins. At
white sites, the EPA orders treatment 22 percent more often than containment").
33. Id. ("For all federal environmental laws aimed at protecting citizens from air, water,
and waste pollution [for example] penalties in white communities were 46 percent higher

than in minority communities").
34. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Interim GuidanceForInvestigating Title VIAdministrative Complaints Challenging

Permits(1994). Title VI provides, in relevant part: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the befits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).

1162

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

alleging discrimination in the environmental permitting context.3 9
While laying out the appropriate procedures for processing complaints
made to the EPA pursuant to Title VI, the Guidance also notes that
"individuals may file a private right of action in court to enforce the
nondiscrimination requirements in Title VI or EPA's implementing
regulations without exhausting administrative remedies."'
Unfortunately, as the basis for this statement, the EPA cites to Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,4' a Third Circuit
decision which has recently been vacated by the United States Supreme
Court.42 Does the private right of action still exist?
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: PROVING
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

Formal opposition to the discriminatory siting of a hazardous waste
treatment facility may take the form of an administrative or judicial
complaint filed against a facility that is, or will be in noncompliance
with an applicable environmental statute." Filing under an environmental law is an effective approach when there is a violation of an
environmental statute." Most environmental laws, however, provide
little in the way of protection from discrimination. When the problem
is a disproportionate burden on a minority community, citizens have
preferred to litigate the siting based on alleged civil rights violations.4 5
Unfortunately, until very recently civil rights actions based on
discrimination in the environmental context have been overwhelmingly
unsuccessful." Lack of success may be attributed to the requirement
that claimants under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
prove that a discriminatory intent motivated the policy maker to site the

39. Interim Guidance For Investigating Title VI Administrative ComplaintsChallenging
Permits,at 2. Title VI complaints filed with the EPA prior to the passage of the Executive
Order and the Interim Guidance, "typically alleged discrimination in access to public water

and sewerage systems or in employment practices." Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id.
42. Seif 119 S. Ct. at 22.
43. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 827-28.
44. Most environmental statutes do provide citizen suit provisions designed to allow
individuals to challenge the actions of potential or actual violators of the statute. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (citizen suit provision for the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(1994) (citizen suit provision for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659 (1994) (citizen suit provision for Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act).
45. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 828.

46. Id.
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facility at a certain location.47 Proving the subjective intent of a
decision maker has become nearly impossible, particularly when low
property values offer an alternate explanation for the siting decision.'
As discussed above, the environmental justice movement is usually
traced back to 1982. In NAACP v. Gorsuch,49 state officials had
approved the proposed siting of a PCB landfill in predominantly black
Warren County, North Carolina. Plaintiffs sought injunctions to prevent
the siting, arguing that the siting was racially motivated. ° As
evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiffs pointed to eight other
counties in the state where the soil was more suitable for the facility. 1
The court, holding that there was no proof of intent to discriminate
and
52
that no irreparable injury would occur, dismissed the suit.
In Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.;53 plaintiffs sought
a preliminary injunction, alleging racial discrimination in the Texas
Department of Health's decision to grant a permit for the operation of
a solid waste facility in a predominantly minority area of Harris County,
Texas.54 The court found that because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the siting was within a minority "census tract," there was no
evident pattern of discriminatory practice.55 The court, relying on
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devevelopment
Corp., found that, although "unfortunate and insensitive," the decision
to grant the permit was not motivated by purposeful racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983."s

47. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
The intent requirement
has been interpreted by the Court to demand claimants demonstrate that race "has been
a motivating factor in the decision," and that the decision was made, not merely in spite
of, but in part "because of' its adverse effect on the class. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
48. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 830. Lazarus also points out that, among the
problems associated with proving discriminatory intent is the fact that "a community may
become a 'minority community' only after a hazardous waste facility is located there,
because of the decrease in property values caused by the siting." Id. at 831.
49. No. 82-768-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982).
50. Warren County has the highest percentage of minority population of any county in
North Carolina. See Valerie J. Phillips, Have Low Income, Minorities Been Left Out Of The
Environmental Cleanup? 38-Oct ADVOCATE (Idaho) 16 n.17 (1995)
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
54. 482 F. Supp. at 674-75.
55. Id. at 677. See also Phillips, supra note 50, at 18 (noting that reliance on a "census
tract" analysis allows courts "to rationalize by pointing to the sites located in majority
white census tracts which are actually located within larger minority communities").
56. 482 F. Supp. at 680.
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Little had changed when, ten years later, in East Bibb Twiggs
NeighborhoodAss'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning& Zoning Commission,57 plaintiffs challenged the decision of the local planning and
zoning commission to allow creation of a private landfill in a predominantly black community.58 The challenge was brought under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the
Commission was partially motivated by race in violation of the
Constitution.59 Local residents had consistently opposed the landfill
siting. The court interpreted their opposition as adequate participation
in the siting process to ensure that a nondiscriminatory siting process
had been followed by the Commission.'
Likewise, in R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,"' a community organization alleged
that they were denied equal protection when the County Board of
Supervisors approved the siting of a regional landfill in a predominantly
black section of the county.6 2 Among its findings of fact, the court
noted that: (1) the population of the county was approximately fifty
percent black and fifty percent white; (2) thirty-nine blacks and twentytwo whites lived within a half-mile of the proposed regional landfill site;
(3) the racial make-up of the community when a landfill was sited there
in 1969 was one hundred percent black; (4) the racial make-up of the
community when a second landfill was situated there in 1971 was
approximately ninety-five percent black; and (5) when a third landfill
was sited there in 1977, an estimated one hundred percent of the
residents living within a half-mile radius were black.6" Despite finding
that the placement of the landfills from 1969 to 1991 had had a
disproportionate impact on black residents, the court rejected plaintiffs'
claim.' In concluding, the court stated, "the Equal Protection Clause
does not impose an affirmative duty65 to equalize the impact of official
decisions on different racial groups."
Such has been the position of equal protection challenges to the siting
of hazardous waste facilities in minority communities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. By far, the greatest obstacle to success in such suits has

57. 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
58. Id. at 881.

59. Id. at 884.
60. Id. at 885.
61.
62.
63.
64.

768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1149.

65. Id. at 1150.
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been the lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent.6 Attorney
Dominique Shelton has pointed out that in the environmental context,
unlike traditional civil rights cases, "courts have refused to admit
statistical evidence of disparate siting patterns to prove intentional
discrimination." 7 This refusal, according to some commentators,
defeats most equal protection challenges.6"
Courts have been more receptive to a finding of discriminatory intent
when provision of municipal services are at issue. In Ammons v.Dade
City,69 black residents brought an action under Title VI against the city
and several officials seeking to restrain defendants from providing
municipal services in a racially discriminatory manner. The court,
noting it was apparent that there existed a significant disparity in the
provision of street paving, street resurfacing and maintenance, and
storm water drainage facilities between black and white communities,
held there was sufficient evidence from which to infer discriminatory
intent.7 ° When the issue involves the allocation of risk, such that one
community's gain will be another's loss, however, courts have been less
willing to find discriminatory intent. Another tool is needed.
IV. TITLE VI AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT REQUIREMENT
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance from
discriminating based on race, color, or national origin. 7' Authority for
promulgating regulations for the enforcement of Title VI are found in 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1, which provides that agencies, such as the EPA, that
provide financial assistance, may effectuate Title VI "by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute .... 72 Pursuant to
that authority, the EPA promulgated regulations designed to limit
federal funds to organizations which did not comply with the protections
afforded by Title VI. 7' In short, if the EPA finds that a recipient of

66.

See Shelton, supra note 23, at 12.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986).
70. Id. at 987-88. See also Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983)
and Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986). In each case the court
inferred discriminatory intent from the government's knowledge of existing disparities in
municipal services.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).
73. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1994).
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federal funds is in violation of Title VI or the implementing regulations,
the EPA can move to suspend funding.74

Rather than mirroring the statutory language and requiring proof of
discriminatory intent, the EPA's regulations expressly provide for a
disparate impact analysis. Under 40 C.F.R. section 7.35(b),
[a] recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of
administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individu-

als to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex,
or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a
particular race, color, national origin, or sex.75

The standard the EPA applies when a complaint is submitted pursuant
to these enforcement regulations is one of effect, not intent.76 Effect
can be objectively measured and demonstrated through statistical
data-a form of evidence which courts have been particularly unwilling
to review in equal protection suits.
While Title VI and the EPA's regulations have been in place for
several years, prior to 1993 they were not utilized in the environmental
justice context. In other areas of the civil rights movement, however,
Title VI has consistently been successful. In North CarolinaDepartment
of Transportation v. Crest Street Committee Council,77 for instance,
citizens filed an administrative complaint with the United States
Department of Transportation, challenging the North Carolina Department of Transportation's proposed extension of a largely federally funded
expressway through an established, predominantly black neighborhood
in Durham, North Carolina, as a violation of Title VI. 71 Subsequent
negotiations resulted, after five years, in a Final Mitigation Plan
executed by79petitioners, respondents, and the city that resolved the
controversy.

74. Id.
75. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the EPA specifically
identified the siting of facilities as a potential source of discrimination.
A recipient [of federal funds] shall not choose a site or location of a facility that
has the purpose or effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits
of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any program to which this Part
applies on the grounds of race, color, or national origin or sex; or with the purpose
or effect of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
objectives of this subpart.
Id. at § 7.35(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id.
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In the meantime, construction of the highway extension had been
enjoined by the federal district court in an unrelated action alleging
violations of certain federal statutes that did not include any civil rights
laws.8 ° The citizens' group moved to intervene in that action and filed
a proposed complaint asserting Title VI violations." The district court
subsequently entered a consent judgment dissolving the injunction and
dismissing the action, along with the citizens' groups' Title VI claims, on
the condition that petitioners implement the Final Mitigation Plan.2
The Title VI claims, although dismissed, were instrumental in achieving
the ends sought by the citizens group.
In NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,' a group of AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and handicapped individuals brought an action
under Title VI against a local hospital and certain government officials
to prevent the relocation of the hospital ("WMC") to a new suburban
area.'
The suit resulted in a court order that the Department of
Health Education and Welfare ("HEW") investigate WMC's planned
relocation to determine if Title VI rights were being violated.8 5 Finding
that the planned relocation would violate plaintiffs' rights, HEW entered
into negotiations with WMC, which ultimately amended its plan in order
to satisfy the concerns of the citizens' group. 6 While the ultimate
decision by the trial court denied plaintiffs' the relief they sought, the
Title VI claims did force WMC to meet needs of minority citizens which
otherwise might have been ignored.87
Likewise, in Johnson v. City of Arcadia,8s black citizens of Arcadia
brought an action against the city and various city officials alleging
deprivation of equal municipal services violative of Title VI. 9 The
court held that inequality in services and facilities provided to black
residents of the city with respect to street paving, parks, and recreation
and in provision of a water supply system were the results of systematic
racial discrimination in violation of plaintiffs' rights.' It is apparent

80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 10.
Id.
530 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Del. 1981).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021.
Id.
Id. at 1022.

88.

450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).

89. Id. at 1367.
90. Id. at 1368. See also Young v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (finding
Title VI violations in housing programs); and Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297
F. Supp. 291, 293 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (addressing Alabama's violation of the Equal Protection
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that Title VI provides a successful framework for addressing discriminatory policies and decisions, even when those policies are not based on an
intent to discriminate.
Unfortunately, the EPA has historically taken a very narrow view of
its responsibilities and opportunities under Title VI. In 1971, soon after
the EPA's creation, EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus testified
before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, that there were
"'limitations' on what a 'regulatory agency' such as EPA could do
consistent with its statutory mandate to achieve pollution control.""'
In explaining the Agency's rationale, the administrator noted that
denying or terminating funding would cause communities to violate
environmental laws, which would be counter-productive to the Agency's
purpose,
without ensuring a change in racially discriminatory practic92
es.
It would not be a penalty against that community at all and it would
be no incentive for them to go ahead and do what we were asking them
to do, because in fact they might consider it a benefit not to have to
spend that additional money for the construction of a sewage treatment
plant which our*matching fund would force them to spend.93
Responding to the suggestion that the EPA couple the denial of federal
funds with lawsuits against the Title VI violator, Administrator
Ruckleshaus expressed concern that such action would simply cause
further delay in meeting national pollution control objectives while the
suit was being litigated.94
The EPA's failure to be proactive in enforcing Title VI did not go
unnoticed. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted in 1975 that the
EPA was responsible for ensuring that violations of fair housing laws,
the absence of a fair housing agency, and the existence of exclusionary
zoning laws did not contribute to the exclusion of minorities from EPA
assistance.95 The Commission further noted that the EPA had not

Clause in the operation of mental health facilities in the state, and the subsequent steps
taken by HEW to terminate federal funding under Title VI and agency enforcement
regulations).
91. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 837 (citing U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, Hearing
Held In Washington, D.C. 147 (June 14-17, 1971) (testimony of William Ruckleshaus,
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency).

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, Hearing Held In Washington, D.C.,
supra note 91, at 151).
95. Id. (citing 6 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The FederalCivil Rights Enforcement
Effort-1974, 598-99 (1975)).
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satisfied that responsibility.9" "EPA provides funds to municipalities
without taking adequate steps to ensure that they are in compliance
with Title VI, and ... EPA has been lax in executing its Title VI
mandate."97 In recent years, however, the EPA has begun to realize
more of its potential under the Civil Rights legislation.
In September and November, 1993, the first Title VI complaints based
on environmental justice issues were filed with the EPA."8
The
Louisiana complaint alleged that the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") was violating Title VI by considering for permit
a hazardous waste storage facility in an area already saturated with
chemical plants." The area, just west of New Orleans, is predominantly African-American and was, at the time, already home to ten major
chemical plants.'0° The complaint asked the Federal EPA to intervene
with the Louisiana DEQ to "force those agencies to look at environmental justice concerns. " 1°
The EPA accepted the Louisiana complaint and a similar complaint
filed against the Mississippi DEQ, marking the first time any citizens'
group had complained to the EPA using Title VI.1 °2 In response to the
prospect of losing federal funding, and without admitting to any form of
discrimination, the Louisiana DEQ denied the permit application. The
Agency found that the applicant, Supplemental Fuels, Inc. ("SFI") had
failed to analyze alternative sites."03 The EPA's investigation into the

96. Id.
97. Id. at 838.
98. The procedure for filing a Title VI complaint with EPA consists of filing a letter,
preferably with the EPA's Office of Civil Rights, alleging a discriminatory action or effect
by someone receiving federal funds. It is not even necessary to designate the action as a
violation of Title VI. The complaint should, at a minimum, allege discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin, including a description of the discriminatory acts and
the program or activity receiving federal aid. EPA will then proceed, if it determines that
a valid complaint exists, to notify the alleged violator and to investigate the allegations.
See Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, EnvironmentalJustice and the EPA: The Brief History of
Administrative Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. ENVTL. L.
& LrrIG. 309, 314-15 (1994).
99. Cole, supra note 98, at 327-28 (noting that the affected area, known affectionately
as "cancer alley" is home to 175 chemical plants. "The annual per capita tonics load in the
area, 352 pounds, is significantly higher than the state average of 105 pounds and the
Parish average of 168 pounds. Cancer death rates in the area have been found to be among
the highest in the United States").
100. Id. (citing Scott Bronstein,Around the South, EnvironmentalRacism? U.S. Opens
Probe of Toxic Dump Sites in South, SuN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 20, 1994,
at IF.
101. Id. at 331.
102. Id. at 334.
103. Id. at 334-35.
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alleged discriminatory siting practice was suspended when SFI brought
suit against the Louisiana DEQ.0 4
Since those first complaints were filed with the EPA in 1993, the
number of Title VI-type grievances submitted to the EPA have increased. °5 Administrative complaints are not, however, without a few
disadvantages. First, time limits are rarely met. While the EPA is
required by statute to make preliminary findings on a complaint within
180 days, that just has not happened. 0 6 A second disadvantage is that
complainants are largely left out of the investigation. °7 A third
disadvantage is tied to litigation, as is a fourth.'
Remedies through
appeal to the EPA are indirect, offering complainants only promised
compliance by the violator or termination of funding.'
This does
little to compensate citizens for harm already suffered. Nor does filing
a complaint with the EPA toll the statute of limitations."0 If a citizen
or group of citizens does not get adequate relief through appeal to the
EPA, it may be too late to file a legitimate lawsuit. But can environmental justice advocates file civil suits for Title VI violations?
In areas other than environmental justice, private actions have been
brought under Title VI to redress discriminatory practices. In Lau v.
Nichols,"' for instance, non-English speaking students brought a Title
VI action, alleging that they had been deprived of educational opportunities inasmuch as courses were taught only in English, and were,
therefore, completely inaccessible." 2 The Supreme Court held that
Title VI had been violated by the challenged policies, even though there
had been no discriminatory intent."3 Likewise, in GuardiansAss'n v.
Civil Service Commission,1"4 the Court reaffirmed the fact that discriminatory intent is not required under Title VI, the view historically
endorsed by applicable federal agency regulations implementing the

104. See In re Supplemental Fuels, Inc., 656 So. 2d 29 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 656
So. 2d 41 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that Supplemental Fuels, Inc. was not entitled to a de
novo review of the Louisiana DEQ's denial of applicant's permit).
105. Cole, supra note 98, at 346. The author identifies seventeen complaints filed
between September 13, 1993 and September 13, 1994 which EPA deemed to implicate Title
VI. Id. at 324.
106. Id. at 321 (noting that, as of March 1995, EPA had never met this statutory

deadline in environmental justice cases, with the current backlog at eighteen months).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
112. Id. at 565-65.
113. Id. at 568-69.
114. 463 U.S. 582, cert. denied, 463 U.S. '1228 (1983).
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statutory mandate." 5 The Court also pointed out that there is an
implied private right of action under Title VI."' The Court did not,
however, decide whether such an implied private right of action
extended to agency regulations implementing Title VI. Does the private
right of action extend to complaints based on discriminatory effect alone?
V

CITIZENS OF CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA FILE SUIT BASED ON
DISPARATE IMPACT

FactualBackground
Chester, Pennsylvania, is a small urban city of about 39,000 residents,
situated in Delaware County along-side the Delaware River."" While
Delaware County is predominantly white (ninety-one percent), African-

A.

Americans make up over sixty-five percent of Chester's residents."'
Chester has the highest crime rates in the state, among the poorest
schools in the state, and dramatically lower median incomes than the
remainder of Delaware County." 9 Such conditions led city government
officials, according to one commentator, to encourage anyone and
everyone to bring jobs to Chester. 20
Once an industrial "boom-town,"'' Chester is now a home for
numerous hazardous waste treatment facilities and hazardous waste
producers.' 22 Facilities in Chester include the DELCORA sewage
waste treatment facility,'3 the Westinghouse Resource Recovery
Facility ("the Westinghouse incinerator"),' 2' and the Abbonizio Recy-

115. 463 U.S. at 584 n.2.
116. Id. at 593.
117. See Foster, supra note 24, at 779.
118. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1997).
119. Foster, supra note 24, at 779 (citing Craig Offerman, Trouble Comes To Toxic
Town USA, GEORGE, Mar. 1998, at 94; and Brent Staples, Life in the Toxic Zone, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at A14) (The author points out that Chester also has the highest
child mortality rate in Pennsylvania).
120. Id. at 783.
121. Amicus Briefto United States Supreme Court by the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, et al., 1998 WL 457676 (citing Council of the City of Chester, Chester City
Vision 2000, Comprehensive Plan & Economic Development Strategy at 8 (1994)).
122. Foster, supra note 24, at 781.
123. Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413, 415
(E.D. Penn. 1996) (noting that the DELCORA has a permit allowing it to "treat 44,000,000
gallons of sewage a day and an air quality permit to incinerate 17,500 tons per year of
sewage sludge").
124. Id. The Westinghouse incinerator is one of the largest in the country, and is
permitted to burn over 2,000 tons of trash per day, which includes waste from states as far
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cling Corporation, 125 as well as numerous older industries, such as
WITCO Chemicals, Scot Paper, British Petroleum, and Sunoco Oil. 2 "
Between 1986 and 1996, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection ("DEP") issued seven permits for commercial waste facilities
127
in Delaware County, five of which would be located in Chester.
Unfortunately, once hazardous waste facilities begin locating in an area,
other businesses typically avoid the area, leading to the eventual
reputation of the area as a "toxic wasteland" fit only for continued use
by other waste treatment and disposal facilities."m
The clustering of waste facilities and the associated potential health
risks led the EPA, pursuant to President Clinton's Executive Order on
Environmental Justice, to conduct a six-month cumulative risk
assessment in Chester."2
The study concluded that residents of
Chester were subject to increased risks of kidney and liver disease,
increased respiratory problems from the pollution in the community,
increased health risks stemming from the children's increased levels of
lead in their blood, and increased risks of cancer associated with air
emissions from facilities in and around Chester."s While causation is
difficult to prove, the common perception is that "the community's poor
health status is linked to the surrounding waste processing facilities." 131
As a result of what one community member has referred to as
"condescending behavior" by government and private industry representatives in response to community concerns, residents formed Chester
Residents Concerned About Quality of Life ("CRCQL").13 2 CRCQL has
conducted protests (the first, blocking the highway utilized to deliver
waste to the Westinghouse incinerator); presented organized opposition
at town council hearings over potential sitings; met with government
and industry officials to discuss pollution problems in the community;
and appealed permits issued by the Pennsylvania DEP." 3 In 1996
CRCQL broke new ground when it filed a civil action against the
Pennsylvania DEP, under Title VI and the EPA's implementing

away as Ohio. See Foster, supra note 24, at 781.
125. Foster, supra note 24, at 781. Abbonizio is a demolition debris recycling company

responsible for enormous amounts of dust in Chester. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 786.
129. Id. at 782.
130. Id. at 781-82.
131. Id. at 782.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 812-16.
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regulations, challenging DEP's unequal distribution of waste facilities in
Delaware County."3
B.

ProceduralHistory and Trial Court Rationale

The residents of Chester, in their suit against, inter alia, DEP
Secretary James Seif, complained that the process utilized by DEP to
determine whether to grant permits for potential waste treatment
facilities discriminated against the minority community by "concentrating the burden of pollution and the negative health effects it causes,
within the African-American community in Chester while leaving the
white residents of Delaware County essentially free of the pollution their
waste caused."" 5 More specifically, CRCQL asserted that DEP's grant
of a permit to Soil Remediation Services, Inc. for the operation of a soil
incineration facility violated the civil rights of CRCQL's members. The
citizens' group accused DEP of violating: (1) section 601 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; (2) the EPA's civil
rights regulations, 40 C.F.R. section 7.10 et seq., promulgated pursuant
to section 602 of Title VI; and (3) DEP's assurance pursuant to the EPA
regulations that it would not violate the regulations. 3 "
Defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds that CRCQL had
failed to allege discriminatory intent consistent with Title VI, and that
there was no private right of action under the EPA's implementing
regulations.'3 7 Noting the Supreme Court had already identified an
implied cause of action under Title VI, the trial court examined whether
disparate impact alone could suffice as a valid claim under Title VI.'"
Citing an opinion by Justice Marshall, the court held that Title VI
reached only discriminatory intent violations, and that allegations of
discriminatory effect must be handled through agency regulations.'3 9
Defendants' motion to dismiss Claim I was, therefore, granted without
prejudice."
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had never decided whether an
implied private right of action existed under the EPA's regulations, the
court turned to Third Circuit precedent for guidance.' 4' In Chowdhury

134. Chester Residents, 944 F. Supp. at 415.
135. Id. (citing the Complaint at pgs. 31, 44).
136. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 927-28.
137. Id. at 928. In fact, CRCQL did not allege discriminatory intent in their original
complaint, and their attempts to amend through their Brief in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss were rejected. Chester Residents, 944 F. Supp. at 416.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 416-17 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985)).
140. Id. at 417.
141. Id. at 417 n.5.
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v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center,4 2 the Third Circuit examined
the question of whether a private plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies under section 602 of Title VI and its implementing
regulations before bringing suit directly under section 601.143

The

Third Circuit's decision in Chowdhury, according to the court, limited
remedies under EPA regulations to the cessation of federal funding and
voluntary compliance, and no role or remedy was provided for the
individual citizen.' 44 Accordingly, defendants' motions for dismissal of
Claims II and III were also granted, with prejudice.'" Determined
that EPA's regulations did provide for an implied private cause of action
for discriminatory
impact claims, CRCQL filed its appeal with the Third
14
Circuit.
VI.

THIRD CIRCUIT REVERSES, FINDING IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION

The Third Circuit began its analysis of the question presented by
looking to relevant Supreme Court authority in the form of Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission.147 GuardiansAss'n related to a suit
by black and hispanic police officers alleging that lay-offs by their
department violated Title VI.'" The case resulted in a fragmented
decision by the Court, with five separate opinions being filed. 49 The
Third Circuit acknowledged that two propositions were apparent from
Guardians: "(1) a private right of action exists under section 601 of Title
VI that requires plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination; and (2)
discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by agencies pursuant to
section 602 are valid exercises of their authority under that section.""6
Whether a private right of action existed under the regulations was not,
however, explicitly addressed in GuardiansAss'n. The Third Circuit did
agree with plaintiffs, however, that a close reading of the opinions in
Guardians demonstrated an implicit approval by five Justices of the
existence of a private right of action under discriminatory effect

142. 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
143. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 929.
144. ChesterResidents,944 F. Supp. at 417 (citing Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 677 F.2d at 319-20).
145. Id. at 418.
146. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 925.
147. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
148. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 929.
149. Id.
150. Id. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985).
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regulations.15' The court of appeals declined to base its decision solely
on extrapolations from the GuardiansAss'n opinion, however, holding
that Supreme Court precedent was not dispositive.'52
The court next examined the precedent that the trial court relied on.
The district court, the Third Circuit stated, had misinterpreted and
misapplied Chowdhury.'" "Chowdhury does not hold that no private
right of action exists under section 602 .... It merely indicates that the
regulations themselves do not expressly provide for a significant role for
private parties ...

.""'

Because Third Circuit precedent was also

insufficient to settle the question presented, the Third Circuit
next
155
looked at whether a private right of action should be implied.
In Angelastro v. PrudentialBache Security, Inc.,' 6 the Third Circuit
established a three-prong test for determining when to imply a private
right of action to enforce regulations. The test requires that courts
inquire: "(1) 'whether the agency rule is properly within the scope of the
enabling statute'; (2) 'whether the statute under which the rule was
promulgated properly permits the implication of a private right of
action'; and (3) 'whether implying a private right of action will further
the purpose of the enabling statute.'"'5 7 Finding that EPA's regulations easily satisfied the first prong of this test, the court of appeals
turned to number two.'5
The key factors in examining the second prong, set out by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,'59 are investigation of whether there is
"any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one," and whether it is "consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff.""8 In its amicus brief, the United States contended that
an implied private right of action was consistent with legislative intent

151. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 930. This opinion by the Third Circuit was based
in part on the willingness of Justice White to allow private plaintiffs to proceed under
section 601 in cases of discriminatory effect; on similar statements by Justice Marshall in
his dissenting opinion; and on the opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, that plaintiffs would only be required to show discriminatory effects in
order to prove violations of the regulations. Id.
152. Id. at 931.
153. Id. at 932.
154. Id.
155. Id, at 933.
156. 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985).
157. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,
994 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 764 F.2d at 947)).
158. Id.
159. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
160. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 933 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 (1975)).

1176

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

"because Congress acknowledged the existence of the right when it
amended Title VI ...

to broaden [its] scope .. .. "161 In addition, the

United States submitted, as evidence of legislative intent, a House
Report on an earlier version of the bill,1"2 several legislators' comments
in the Congressional Record," and various congressional hearing
testimonies.'" The Third Circuit accepted the evidence offered by the
United States as an indication that there was legislative intent to create
a private right of action sufficient to satisfy the first element of the Cort
test. 6 '
The court of appeals also found that the implication of a private right
of action would be consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI. 66
The primary purpose of section 602's procedural requirements is to
provide notice to the federal funding recipient of alleged violations and
of the potential consequences.' 67 The court found that a private cause
of action would provide similar notice." 6 Additionally, the court
pointed out that the procedural requirements of section 602 were in
place to prevent fund recipients from being surprised by the enormous
impact of the cessation of federal funds, an impact which private
plaintiffs could not impose. 6 9 Consequently, the court determined that
the statute under which EPA's rules were promulgated "properly
permit[ed] the implication of a private right of action [cites omitted] and
that the second prong of the test [was] satisfied." 7 °
Finally, the Third Circuit held that implying a private right of action
would further the purposes of the enabling statute, which were to: "(1)
combat discrimination by entities who receive federal funds; and (2)
provide citizens with effective protection against discrimination." 7 '
The court found that permitting a private right of action would further

161. Id.
162. Id. at 934 (citing H.R. REP. No. 963 (1986), which provides that the "private right
of action which allows a private individual or entity to sue to enforce Title IX would
continue to provide the vehicle to test certain regulations in Title IX and their expanded
meaning to their outermost limits.") Later in the opinion the Third Circuit points out that
"Courts have regarded Title IX and Title VI jurisprudence as, more or less, interchangeable." Id. at 934 n.12.
163. Id. at 934 (noting that the legislators comments "appear to recognize the existence
of a private right of action").
164. Id.
165. Id.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 936.
Id. at 935-36.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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these purposes by "deputiz[ing] private attorneys general" to enforce
section 602 and its implementing regulations, and would compensate for
the EPA's lack of enforcement resources. 172 The third prong, the court
held, was satisfied."'
The court finished its opinion with a brief review of other court of
appeals decisions which, although not precisely on point, did offer
support for allowing the private cause of action.' 74 All permitted
plaintiffs to bring suits based on discriminatory impact grounds rather
than requiring discriminatory intent, and all permitted the suit to be
brought under the regulations, rather than under the statute. Holding
that "private plaintiffs may maintain an action under discriminatory
effect regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies
pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," the
Third Circuit reversed and remanded ChesterResidents for reconsideration. 175 The citizens of Chester had won a major battle.
The victory was short lived, however, as the Supreme Court granted
certiorari 176 and, subsequently, vacated the Third Circuit's decision
and remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss. 177 While the
Court's decision to vacate the Third Circuit's decision was not accompanied by an opinion, briefs filed by the parties to the action provide some
insight. According to CRCQL's Brief, the SRS permit at issue in the
78
original action was revoked before the Court granted certiorari.'
Petitioners had simply failed to notify the Court. Therefore, there was
currently no case or controversy existing and the case should have been
considered moot.' 79 The motion to find the case moot, and, therefore,
to refrain from hearing and deciding the case, may have been motivated

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 936-37. See, e.g., Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986); New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York,
7i F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995); Casteneda by Casteneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465
n.11 (5th Cir. 1986); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996);
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.,
811 F.2d 1030, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1987); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82
(9th Cir. 1984); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481,486 (10th Cir. 1996); Elston v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993); and Georgia State Conference
of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
175. 132 F.3d at 937.
176. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (Mem)
(1998).

177. Seif 119 S. Ct. at 22.
178. Respondent's Brief to United States Supreme Court, 1998 WL 435980 at *3 (July
29, 1998).

179. Id. at *7.
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by apprehension on the part of environmental justice advocates.
Although the reasoning of the Third Circuit appeared sound, there was
always the potential that the Supreme Court would disagree.
Petitioners, while opposing the suggestion of mootness by respondents,
suggested in the alternative that the Court vacate the Third Circuit's
decision consistent with Court precedent."s Petitioners argued in
their Brief that "the purpose of vacating a judgment that becomes moot
pending review is to return the legal relationships of the parties to the
status that existed prior to the suit."'' Petitioners cited U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership.2 for the proposition that a
"'party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is
frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not in fairness be
forced to acquiesce in the judgment."'" Exactly two weeks after
Petitioner's Brief was filed, the Third Circuit's decision was vacated and
the case was remanded with orders to dismiss."8 ' A cloud of doubt
loomed over private citizens' right to bring discrimination charges
against recipients of federal funds absent proof of discriminatory
85
intent."
VII.

SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT ISSUE

Subsequent to the Third Circuit's decision in Chester Residents, but
prior to the Supreme Court's vacature of that decision, the Middle
District of Alabama had an opportunity to address the same issue.'
In Sandoval v. Hagan, non-English speaking residents brought an action
alleging that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's policy of
administering driver's exams only in English violated rights protected
by enforcement regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title
VI. 7 As was the case in Chester Residents, defendants in Sandoval

180. Petitioner's Brief to United States Supreme Court, 1998 WL 470120 (Aug. 3, 1998).
181. Id. at *13.
182. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
183. Petitioner's Brief to United States Supreme Court, 1998 WL at *15-16 (citing U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. at 25).
184. Seif, 119 S. Ct. at 22.
185. See The South Bronx Coalition For Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565,
572 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (based on the Supreme Court's vacature of Chester Residents, the New
York court questioned whether there even exists a right to a "'disparate impact' private
cause of action under federal regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI").
186. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
187. Id. at 1244. Prior to 1991, Alabama had administered its driver's exams in at
least fourteen languages. Pursuant to a law passed in the Alabama legislature in 1990,
however, mandating that English be utilized as the official language of state government,
all driver's exams became English-only exams, with no available assistance from translators or other interpretive aids. Id. at 1243.
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argued that there existed no private right of action under the implementing regulations to Title VI."s The court disagreed, finding that
an implied private right of action existed within the regulations,
consistent 9with the intent of Congress, as well as with other court
decisions.1

The court began its analysis by recognizing that neither Title VI nor
the regulations implemented pursuant to section 2000d-1 expressly
authorized a private right of action, but that a private right of action
was clearly implied within Title VI itself."9 The court then referred
to two Eleventh Circuit cases, Georgia State Conference of Branches of
NAACP v. Georgia9 ' and Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education,"g both of which related to private litigants bringing suit pursuant to § 2000d-1 regulations. In both cases, the courts by-passed the
issue of whether a private cause of action existed, and proceeded instead
to address the merits. Because both cases allowed suit to proceed based
on disparate impact, rather than requiring a showing of discriminatory
intent, the Alabama District Court found they had implicitly supported
93
the existence of an implied private right under section 2000d-1.

Additionally, the court relied on two Eleventh Circuit cases which
recently held that federal rights may be created by valid regulations that
merely further define or flesh out the content of the statutory right."9
Noting the purpose of Title VI was obviously to prohibit discrimination
in programs receiving federal funds, the court stated that there was "no
principled reason to deny an implied private right of action under
regulations effectuating the provisions of a statute containing an implied
right of action."'95

188. Id. at 1251-52 n.14.
189. Id. at 1264.
190. Id. at 1253 (citing Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)
(stating "'we have no doubt that Congress ... understood Title VI as authorizing an
implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination'"); and Cone
Corp. C.H. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1201 n.37 (11th Cir. 1991) ("finding
that Title VI (§ 2000d) authorized private cause of action against the Florida Department
of Transportation and its Secretary")).
191. 775 F.2d 1403, 1407 (11th Cir. 1985) (involving a suit by black schoolchildren
challenging policies and practices of Georgia State Board of Education and several local
school districts).
192. 997 F.2d 1394, 1400 (11th Cir. 1993) (involving a suit brought by black
schoolchildren and their parents in opposition to restructuring plans made by the
Talladega County school system).
193. Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
194. Id. at 1253-54 (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1997) and
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998)).
195. Id. at 1254.

1180

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Finally, the court concluded that, even if Elston and Georgia State
Conference did not lead to the conclusion that section 2000d-1 regulations provided a private right of action, and even if Doe and Harrisdid
not lead to the conclusion that the statute itself, in conjunction with the
regulations implementing the statute, created an enforceable federal
right, a private right existed just the same. 9 ' The court's decision was
based on the same analysis as that applied by Chester Residents for
finding a private cause of action: (1) text; (2) legislative intent; and (3)
the purpose of Title VI. sv In fact, noting that the Third Circuit's
analysis was completely consistent with the Supreme Court's test for
determining whether a private right should be implied, 9 ' the court in
Sandoval adopted the entire line of reasoning of the Third Circuit. 1
In Bryant v. New Jersey Department of Transportation,2° decided
after the Supreme Court's vacature of ChesterResidents, the New Jersey
District Court addressed a Title VI complaint by citizens whose homes
were being condemned pursuant to the construction of a highway and a
tunnel.2 ' Plaintiffs alleged that the imminent action by the state
Department of Transportation ("D.O.T.") would have negative effects
which would fall disproportionately on the "last stable, middle-class
African-American

neighborhoods" in Atlantic City.20 2

Among the

concerns listed by plaintiffs were air quality, traffic, water quality,
wetlands and community character impacts, and the destruction of at
least nine homes in one of the affected communities.203
On reconsideration of the standing issue, the District Court addressed
the right to a private cause of action under the United States Department of Transportation regulations enforcing Title VI. The regulations
state:

196. Id. at 1255.
197. Id.
198. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The four factors identified by the Supreme Court as
pivotal in determining whether a private right of action exists within a statute are (1)
"whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose 'especial benefit' the statute was
enacted; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff; and (4) whether
the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on federal law." Id.
199. Sandoval, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
200. 998 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.J. 1998).
201. Id. at 440-41.
202. Id. at 440.
203. Id.
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In determining the site or location of facilities, a recipient or applicant
may not make selections with the purpose or effect of excluding persons
from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any program to which this regulation applies, on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin; or with the purpose or effect
of defeating or substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
objectives of the Act or this part.2"
The regulation is remarkably similar to the EPA regulation at issue in
Chester Residents. The court, in fact, noting that the regulation was not
"arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to Section 601 [of Title VI],"
cited Chester Residents for the proposition that regulations of this
nature do provide a private right of action for disparate impact
claims.205 The court held, therefore, that because such an interpretation of Section 601 would prohibit the New Jersey D.O.T. from locating
a federally funded highway project in a location which produces a
disparate racial impact, plaintiffs had standing to bring their action.2 °6
Likewise, in Powell v. Ridge,207 plaintiffs brought an action based on
disparate impact. Plaintiffs charged the Governor of Pennsylvania, the
Chairman of the Board of Education, and others with "violating Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and certain regulations promulgated
by the United States Department of Education's Title VI implementing
requirements."2 08 Plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth's statutory public school funding formula had a disparate impact on the school
children of Philadelphia, "the majority of whom are poor and non-white,
in violation of Title VI ... .,209 Citing Chester Residents and Elston v.
Talledega County Board of Education as support for an implied right of
action under an agency's implementing regulations, and noting that the
United States Department of Education's regulations applied a disparate
impact standard, the court held that plaintiffs' claim of discrimination
by disparate impact under section 602 of Title VI would not be dismissed
under the theory that Title VI does not create a private cause of
210
action.
Finally, upon the vacature of ChesterResidents by the Supreme Court,
21 1
defendant in Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
submitted a Motion to Amend Order to Certify Question for Immediate

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(3) (1998) (emphasis added).
Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't of Transp., 998 F. Supp. at 446.
Id.
1998 WL 804727 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1998).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *12.
1998 WL 726653 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1998).

1182

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

Appeal, claiming that there was substantial ground now for a difference
of opinion on whether or not a private right of action existed under
implementing regulations to Title VI. 21 2 Judge Buckwalter cited the
Third Circuit's statement from Chester Residents that "the decisions of
other courts of appeals indicate support of our reasoning [that there is
a private right of action]."213 He then stated:
In summary, in light of overwhelming circuit law to the contrary, I do
not believe I can fairly imply from the grant of certiorari in Chester
Residents that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists
regarding the issue of whether Title VI implementing regulations
create an implied right of action based upon unintentional discrimination.214
The motion was denied.215
In summary, while the vacature of Chester Residents may have cast
some doubt on a private plaintiff's ability to bring an action for
violations based on discriminatory impact alone, most courts have, to
this point, acted consistent with the reasoning of the Third Circuit.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the Supreme Court's vacature of the Third Circuit's
decision, citizens' groups are faced with some degree of uncertainty. Can
communities who encounter circumstances similar to those endured by
the residents of Chester, file a private action without proof of discriminatory intent? As the Third Circuit pointed out, GuardiansAss'n decided
that a private right of action was implied under section 601 of Title VI.
Such a private right, however, being tied directly to Title VI, would
require proof of discriminatory intent. GuardiansAss'n also provided
that federal agencies acted within their authority under section 602 of
Title VI when they promulgated regulations implementing a disparate
impact standard. Without an implied private right within the regulations themselves, however, the disparate impact standard would be
applied only by the federal agencies distributing the funds. Guardians
Ass'n did not decide whether an implied private right of action existed
under agency regulations. Was the Third Circuit's analysis correct?
The three-part test applied by the court in Chester Residents was, as
the Sandoval court pointed out, completely consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. The primary factor in determining whether a private

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at*1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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right of action may be implied is the intent of the legislature. It was the
apparent intent of the legislature that citizens be protected from the
impact of discrimination, particularly when that impact was a result of
the actions of a recipient of federal funds. While the statute itself may
only reach to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was no
restriction placed on Federal agencies in implementing the legislative
mandate. The Department of Education, the Department of Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency have all enacted
regulations which set in place a disparate impact standard. Each of
these sets of regulations have now been tested to see if they permit use
by private citizens, and each court analyzing the regulations has
confirmed the reasoning from Chester Residents that an implied private
right does exist.
Because discriminatory intent is so difficult to prove, the implementing regulations to Title VI may be the most accessible, most effective tool
in the environmental justice tool chest. Title VI is not without its own
set of limitations, however. To begin with, Title VI protects residents
from discrimination, but only from discrimination by "any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."216 For environmental
justice advocates, this may not be a significant obstacle because most
state environmental programs receive funds from the Federal Government. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA-),217 for instance, contributes large amounts
of money to clean up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites.2 18
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA) 2 19 offers
considerable funds to states to assist with development and implementation of authorized state hazardous waste programs, 220 to assist with
development and implementation of federally approved state solid waste
programs, 2' and to assist rural communities with waste management
facilities. 22 Air, water, and hazardous waste programs are regular
recipients of federal funds.
The second limitation may be of little concern as well. Until recently,
it appeared that the only remedy to be had under Title VI was equitable
in nature. In 1992, however, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public

216.
217.
218.
219.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
Id. §§ 9604, 9611.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).

220. Id. § 6931.
221.
222.

Id. §§ 6947-48.
Id. § 6949.
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Schools,223 the Supreme Court held that a damages remedy is available in implied private rights actions brought under Title IX.2" Title
IX was expressly modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.225
Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that courts would rule the same
remedy is available under Title VI. If Title VI actions are limited to
equitable remedies, such limitations may be secondary for private
citizens in the environmental justice context when the plaintiffs are
simply trying to get the recipient of federal funds to refrain from issuing
a permit or rezoning land to support hazardous waste treatment
facilities. When, however, the recipient has already taken actions that
had a disparate impact and led to actual damages, such as injuring the
health of the residents or lowering property values, it should be expected
that damages would be an important component of any remedy sought.
Administrative remedies under Title VI and the implementing
regulations still exist as well, and should be utilized to the fullest extent
possible. After all, it costs very little to put a complaint in the mail to
the EPA outlining the discriminatory policy and the disparate impact,
and the federal funds recipient allegedly violating the regulations.
Administrative actions alone will rarely be enough to motivate the
federal fund recipient to reconsider their actions.226 When the disproportionate siting of hazardous waste treatment facilities may result in
increased health risks, especially in children, not to mention the effect
on surrounding property values and the depressing effect on incoming
business, communities cannot afford to rely on a single avenue of
redress. Rather, they should rely on both administrative and legal
actions if resources permit.
Finally, the efforts of the Chester community serve as an excellent
example of successful grassroots opposition to environmental injustice.
CRCQL's efforts included physical protests, attendance at hearings and
community meetings, discussions with government and industry officials,
administrative appeal to the EPA, and legal action under Title VI. None
of the efforts standing alone was sufficient to successfully oppose the
local recipients of federal funds, the state courts, and private industry.22 7 It certainly appears for now, though, that private actions under

223. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
224. Id. at 1038.
225. Id. at 1032.
226. See Steven Keeva, Pursuingthe Right to Breathe Easy, 85 A.B.A. J. 48, 49 (1999)

(quoting Zulene Mayfield, founder of CRCQL: "There's a lot that goes into fighting
environmental racism[] There's no recipe. You just keep at it until you find what works.
But we've definitely found that we need the extra armament of having legal counsel").
227. For an excellent detailed discussion of the history of Chester, Pennsylvania, the
formation of CRCQL, and the efforts of CRCQL to remedy the environmental injustice
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Title VI and the EPA's implementing regulations provide citizens' groups
with a powerful lever for moving federal fund recipients toward
environmental justice.
JIMMY WHITE

associated with the clustering of hazardous waste treatment facilities in the community,
see Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the TransformativePoliticsofthe EnvironmentalJusticeMovement, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 775 (1998).

